I. Introduction: From Yalta to YouTube Diplomacy
We are not living in a multipolar world order. We are living among the ruins of its promises. The usual analytical vocabulary – “liberal order,” “rules-based system,” “Westphalian sovereignty” – resembles yellowed theater props, now repurposed as backdrops for influencer-ambassadors vlogging their diplomatic intentions. International politics is no longer a symphony; it’s more like a jazz session: fragmented, improvised, often discordant.
The grammar of geopolitics still hails from the 20th century, but the world it seeks to describe has already changed the score. And the audience? Global, unevenly involved, largely confused.
II. Competing Frameworks: Realism, Multiplex, and the Governance Mirage
John Mearsheimer still calls for spheres of influence as if 1914 had never ended. Amitav Acharya instead sketches a “multiplex world” – decentralized, fragmented, but not anarchic. Both still cling to the belief that some form of governance model is possible – as if the world could be ordered through either balance or bricolage.
But let’s be honest: the very idea of a functioning governance model has become a tragicomic relic. We act as if geopolitics is still an architecture, when in truth it’s a managed ruin. Governance exists today mostly as performance, not practice. It survives in white papers, global summits, and think tank panels – while the real world slides further into unmanaged fragmentation.
The belief in order is itself a form of imperial nostalgia. Samir Amin called this “unequal development,” not as historical accident but as systemic design. Fernando Henrique Cardoso showed that development is a political project, always mediated through dependent power structures. The periphery, far from passive, has long been embedded in this asymmetry – and knows better than to believe in global blueprints.
Branko Milanovic expands this idea with his concept of capitalism’s duality: liberal meritocratic capitalism vs. political capitalism. The success of China’s model exposes that capitalism does not require liberal democracy – and that governance under different norms may function just as effectively.
III. Materiality as Matrix of Power
The new world order isn’t shaped by flags, but by copper, cobalt, and containers. The decisive battlefields lie underground, underwater, in tangled supply chains. Books like The War Below by Ernest Scheyder and Material World by Ed Conway reveal that control over resources and logistics defines strategic autonomy today.
Chokepoints – from the Panama Canal to the Taiwan Strait – are no longer curiosities but pressure points of civilization. Yet diplomacy seems to drift away from these realities.
IV. Diplomacy in the Age of Flatness
Instead of strategic mediation, we witness performative storytelling. While crises multiply, diplomacy morphs into media content. And yet this moment demands diplomacy more than ever: not as PR, but as analytical governance capacity.
As bilateral dependencies reassert themselves – often asymmetrical – the foundations of the multilateral system erode. If strength alone dictates negotiation, diplomacy becomes irrelevant.
Interlude: The Myth of Order
The myth that history leans toward order is itself a product of post-facto narrative. Most of human history has been unstructured, fluid, or violently transitional. Stable order has been the exception – and usually only for elites.
Anthropological and economic research suggest that pre-state societies functioned through negotiated norms, not rigid hierarchies. The notion of institutional order is a modern invention, mostly born out of the 17th to 20th centuries – and arguably already obsolete.
Andrew Leigh captures this illusion in metaphor: “Before mirrors came along, the average person went through life without ever seeing a truly accurate representation of his or her face.” The West’s self-image today is that mirror – cracked.
V. Fragmentation ≠ Soft Multilateralism
We are not transitioning peacefully into a new order. We are regressing into a patchwork of geopolitical egotisms. Not a neo-Metternichian concert, but a cacophony of strategic solipsism. States act as if they can navigate the 21st century solo, while the storms are already planetary.
Peter Zeihan maps these trends, but doesn’t offer strategies. Ian Bremmer warns of crises, yet skirts the roots. The most compelling diagnoses come from outside the Western mainstream – Kishore Mahbubani, Samir Amin, Arjun Appadurai – thinkers who remind us the periphery has always spoken, even when ignored.
Kishore Mahbubani writes: “The West is trapped in intellectual groupthink… and unaware that it is no longer the most dynamic civilization on the planet.” This is not a threat – it’s an overdue observation.
VI. Three Strategic Lessons
Delinking is repositioning, not retreat. Strategic autonomy begins by acknowledging structural inequality. If you supply the raw materials, you should help write the standards.
Diplomacy needs an upgrade. From performative presence back to analytical function. Ambassadors must return to being analysts, not entertainers.
Theory is geopolitical practice. Those who only read U.S. books see only shadows. The future requires hybrid thinking – historically grounded, materially aware, and globally attuned.
Final line:
“Anyone who still believes we live in a multipolar world is watching an orchestra that’s long gone silent – and mistaking the crackle of the speakers for music.”